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To evaluate a new approach towards tackling the undeclared economy, which views
participants as social actors rather than rational economic actors, this article reports
evidence from 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted across the European Union
during 2013. Multilevel logistic regression analysis reveals a strong association between
participation in undeclared work and the level of tax morale. Finding that higher tax
morale (and thus a lower propensity to engage in undeclaredwork) is strongly correlated
with greater levels of state intervention but also with individual-level characteristics such
as gender, age, education and employment status, the article concludes not only by
conﬁrming a political economy approach and refuting modernization and neo-liberal
explanations and remedies, but also by revealing for the ﬁrst time the importance of so-
lutions not so far considered, including improving educational attainment, older citizens
mentoring for younger people and improving women’s participation in the labour force.
1 INTRODUCTION
Tackling undeclared work lies at the very core of the study of industrial relations. Un-
less monetary transactions not declared to the state for tax, social security and/or la-
bour law purposes are addressed, the outcome will be a lack of state control over the
quality of working conditions, weakened trade union and collective bargaining and a
growing pressure on formal businesses to operate undeclared themselves due to the
unfair competition (Andrews et al., 2011). To advance understanding of how to tackle
undeclared work, this article transcends the conventional rational economic actor ap-
proach that views participation in undeclared work as arising when the pay-off is
greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972). Given that many voluntarily comply even when the beneﬁts of undeclared
work outweigh the costs (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008), a ‘social
actor’ approach is advanced, which views participation in undeclared work as arising
when tax morale, deﬁned as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Cummings et al.,
2009; Torgler, 2007a, 2007b), is low. The consequent goal of this emergent approach
is to elicit greater voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour by raising the level
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2 Colin Williams and Ioana HorodnicThis article contributes to the advancement of this emergent tax morale ap-
proach in three ways. First, and empirically, we report a Eurobarometer survey
from 28 member states of the European Union (EU-28) which reveals the strong
positive association between participation in undeclared work and the level of tax
morale at both the individual, population group and country levels, along with
the individual-level and country-level determinants of low tax morale. Second,
we theoretically advance this tax morale approach by viewing tax morale through
the lens of institutional theory as a measure of the gap that exists between the
codiﬁed laws and regulations of formal institutions (which we here term ‘state
morale’) and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions (which
we here term ‘civic morale’) and as low when there is asymmetry between state
morale and civic morale. Finally, we make two policy advances. On the one
hand, we conﬁrm the political economy explanation that higher tax morale
(and thus the propensity to engage in undeclared work) results from greater state
intervention in the form of higher taxes and social expenditure. On the other
hand, we, for the ﬁrst time, display the importance of additional solutions so
far unconsidered, including improving educational attainment, older citizens
mentoring younger people and improving women’s participation in the labour
force as means of improving tax morale (and thus reducing the propensity to en-
gage in undeclared work).
To advance understanding, therefore, the second section reviews the previous
literature on tax morale so as to formulate hypotheses regarding the association
between tax morale and participation in undeclared work, the variations in tax
morale across populations and its determinants and what needs to be done to re-
duce the acceptability of undeclared work. To test these hypotheses, the third sec-
tion then reports the data used, namely, a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving
27,563 face-to-face interviews in the EU-28 and the analytical methods employed:
a staged multilevel logistic regression model utilising the hierarchical nature of
the data (individuals within countries). The fourth section then reports the ﬁnd-
ings, whilst the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section discusses the theoretical and policy
implications.
To deﬁne the undeclared economy, Castells and Portes (1989, 15) describe such
activity as ‘a speciﬁc form of income generating production… unregulated by the
institutions of society in a legal and social environment in which similar activities
are regulated’. Although this deﬁnes the undeclared economy through the lens of
both the formal (‘legal’) and informal (‘social’) institutions in a society, this def-
inition fails to recognise ﬁrst, that the undeclared economy, even if unregulated
by formal institutions, is regulated by the rules of informal institutions and sec-
ond, that such activity can be ‘legitimate’ from the viewpoint of informal institu-
tions even if it is ‘illegal’ from the viewpoint of formal institutions (Williams and
Franic, 2016). Here, therefore, and reﬂecting the consensus in the literature, the
undeclared economy is deﬁned as a socially legitimate activity, which is legal in
all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social security
or labour law purposes (see Williams, 2014a). If it is not legal and legitimate in all
other respects, it is not part of the undeclared economy. Whilst the declared econ-
omy is legal (from the viewpoint of formal institutions) and legitimate (from the
viewpoint of informal institutions), the undeclared economy is illegal but legiti-
mate, unlike the criminal economy (e.g. forced labour), which is both illegal
and illegitimate.© 2016 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Conventionally, a rational economic actor approach ﬁrst proposed by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) has been adopted when considering how to tackle undeclared work.
This views non-compliance as occurring when the pay-off from undeclared work is
greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished. To tackle undeclared
work, most governments have thus concentrated on the cost side of the equation by
increasing the actual and/or perceived level of punishments and likelihood of detec-
tion (e.g. Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Williams, 2014a). However, the evidence that this
is effective is less than conclusive. Although some argue that increasing the penalties
and probability of detection reduces undeclared work, at least for some income
groups (Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Varma and Doob, 1998), others reveal that this in-
creases undeclared work, not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state and
its citizens (Chang and Lai, 2004; Kirchler et al., 2014). Indeed, the perhaps most tell-
ing rebuttal of the rational actor model is that many voluntarily comply even when
the beneﬁt/cost ratio suggests that they should operate on an undeclared basis
(Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007).
To explain this, a ‘social actor’ model has emerged in the form of a tax morale ap-
proach, which views undeclared work as arising when the intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes is low (Alm et al., 2012; Torgler, 2007a,b, 2012). The consequent goal is to raise
tax morale so as to elicit greater voluntary commitment to compliant behaviour (Alm
and Torgler, 2011; Torgler, 2012). Rather than the state pursue compliance through
close supervision and monitoring, tight rules, prescribed procedures and centralised
structures within the context of a low commitment, low trust and adversarial culture,
a high trust, high commitment culture is thus pursued that aligns the values of citizens
with the formal rules so as to generate internal control (Williams, 2014a). Viewing
this tax morale approach through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and
Blinder, 2008; North, 1990), which views all societies as having formal institutions,
which are codiﬁed laws and regulations that deﬁne the legal rules of the game, and
informal institutions, which are the ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that
are created, communicated and enforced outside of ofﬁcially sanctioned channels’
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727), it can be seen that tax morale measures the gap
between the formal institutions (which we here term ‘state morale’) and informal
institutions (here termed ‘civic morale’). When this gap is large, tax morale will be
low, and participation in undeclared work will be more prevalent. To evaluate this
proposition, therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated:Tax morale hypothesis
(H1)© 20the lower is the tax morale (i.e. the greater is the asymmetry
between state morale and civic morale), the greater is the
likelihood of participation in undeclared work.2.1 Variations in tax morale across population groups
In recent years, there has been growing recognition that the level of tax morale varies
across different population groups. First, women are asserted to display a higher tax
morale than men (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Daude et al., 2013; Kastlunger et al., 2013).
Second, tax morale has been argued to increase positively with age (Daude et al.,
2013; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010). Third, tax morale is asserted to be greater16 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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2011; Torgler, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). Fourth, the more educated have been asserted
to have a higher tax morale (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Torgler, 2012), ﬁfth,
larger households and those with children to have higher tax morale (Torgler, 2007b),
sixth, the unemployed and self-employed to have lower tax morale (Alm and Torgler,
2011; Daude et al., 2013), seventh, that tax morale increases with income/ﬁnancial
satisfaction (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010) and eight and ﬁnally, to be higher
in rural than urban areas (Torgler, 2007b). To test these assertions in the context of
the EU-28, therefore, the following hypotheses can be evaluated:H2a© 2016 TWomen are more likely to have higher tax morale than men.
H2b Younger age groups are more likely to have lower tax morale than older age
groups.
H2c Married people have higher tax morale than non-married people.
H2d Workers with fewer years in formal education are more likely to have lower
tax morale than those who spent longer in formal education.
H2d Larger households and those with children have higher tax morale than
smaller and childless households
H2e The self-employed have lower tax morale than those working as employees.
H2f Those with ﬁnancial difﬁculties are more likely to have lower tax morale than
those without ﬁnancial difﬁculties.
H2g Those living in rural areas have higher tax morale than those living in urban
areas.2.2 Cross-national variations in tax morale
Previous cross-national comparative analyses display a strong negative correlation
between the level of tax morale and participation in undeclared work with Pearson
r values between 0.46 and 0.66 (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2012). Compar-
ing post-socialist countries, Torgler (2012) ﬁnds that a decrease of tax morale by one
unit leads to an increase in undeclared work of 20 percentage points. Alm and Torgler
(2006) focusing on Europe and the USA similarly ﬁnd that tax morale explains more
than 20 per cent of the total variance of the size of the undeclared economy.
To explain this, most studies have so far engaged in ‘ﬁshing expeditions’, examining
country-level conditions such as religiosity, social protection and GNP per capita.
Here, a more structured approach is adopted by drawing upon the competing
explanations for the cross-national variations in the size of the undeclared economy
(Williams, 2014a, 2014b; Williams and Horodnic, 2015) to develop hypotheses to test
regarding cross-national variations in tax morale.
First, a ‘modernisation’ thesis has argued that undeclared work is less prevalent
with economic development and the modernisation of government (Geertz, 1963;
Lewis, 1959). From this perspective, therefore, tax morale would thus be lower in less
developed economies, measured in terms of GNP per capita, and countries in which
there is a lack of modernisation of the state bureaucracy. To test this, the following
hypothesis can be evaluated:Modernisation
hypothesis (H3)he Authors. Industrial Relatitax morale will be higher in more modernised economies.ons Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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H3b tax morale will be higher in societies with modern state
bureaucracies.Second, a group of mostly neo-liberal scholars adopt a ‘state over-interference’ thesis
arguing that undeclared work results from a rational economic decision to voluntarily
exit the declared realm because of high taxes and state interference in the free market,
which increases the cost, time and effort associated with declared work (e.g. De Soto,
1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984). Viewed in this
manner, tax morale would be seen as lower in countries with higher taxes and state
interference in work and welfare systems and the consequent solution to pursue tax
reductions and state interference. To evaluate this therefore, the following hypothesis
can be evaluated:State over-interference
hypothesis (H4)tax morale will be higher in economies with lower state-
interference.H4a tax morale will be higher in economies with lower tax
rates.H4b tax morale will be higher in economies with lower levels of
social protection expenditure.Third and ﬁnally, and conversely, political economy scholars have adopted a ‘state
under-intervention’ thesis which purports that undeclared work directly results from
inadequate levels of state intervention in work and welfare arrangements, which
leaves workers less than fully protected and dependent on undeclared work as a sur-
vival strategy in the absence of other means of livelihood and support (Davis, 2006;
Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2014; Likic-Brboric et al., 2013; Sassen, 1997, 2009; Slavnic,
2010; Taiwo, 2013). Consequently, tax morale would be seen as lower in economies
with lower tax rates and levels of social protection. To evaluate this, the following hy-
pothesis can be evaluated:State under-intervention
hypothesis (H5)tax morale will be higher in economies with higher tax
rates and levels of social protection.H5a tax morale will be higher in economies with higher tax
rates.H5b tax morale will be higher in societies with higher levels of
social protection expenditure.2.3 Policy approaches
Based on the aforementioned Allingham and Sandmo (1972) rational economic ac-
tor approach that seeks to change the costs of operating undeclared and beneﬁts of
operating declared, governments have predominantly increased the penalties and
risk of detection (e.g. by increasing inspections). Recently, however, a social actor
model has emerged grounded in a tax morale approach, which views undeclared
work as occurring when tax morale is low, and therefore, the codiﬁed laws and reg-
ulations of formal institutions (state morale) are not aligned with the socially
shared rules of informal institutions (‘civic morale’). Attempts are consequentlyThe Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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altering norms, values and beliefs regarding the acceptability of undeclared work,
such as by raising awareness about the beneﬁts of taxation and the public goods
received. On the other hand, alterations in formal institutions are pursued, includ-
ing not only the processes of formal institutions such as tax fairness, procedural
justice and redistributive justice (Murphy, 2005; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001)
but also various country-level conditions that are asserted to lead to lower tax mo-
rale (Autio and Fu, 2015; Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Klapper et al., 2007;
Thai and Turkina, 2014), although these speciﬁcation of these country-level condi-
tions vary according to whether one adopts a modernization, neo-liberal or polit-
ical economy approach.
However, these different policy approaches for tackling undeclared work, based on
the rational economic actor and social actor models, are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. Indeed, in recent years, a ‘slippery slope framework’ (Kirchler et al., 2008) has
emerged, which argues that governments should pursue both voluntary and enforced
compliance concurrently by developing both greater trust in authorities and the
greater power of authorities (Kogler et al., 2015; Muehlbacher et al., 2011; Wahl
et al., 2010). Until now, however, there has been little comparative evaluation of
whether higher tax morale is associated with higher perceived levels of penalties
and risks of detection, which would suggest that the tax morale approach will be more
effective when combined with the conventional deterrence approach, rather than
when adopted as an alternative policy approach. To evaluate this, the following hy-
pothesis can be therefore tested:Slippery slope
hypothesis (H6)© 2016 The Authors. Indthere is an association between tax morale and the perceived
penalties and risk of detection.3 METHODOLOGY: DATA, VARIABLES AND ANALYTICAL METHODS
3.1 Data
To analyse the level of tax morale (i.e. the acceptability of undeclared work) and its
determinants, data are reported from special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, which
involved 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted in April and May 2013 across the
EU-28. Interviews were conducted in the national language with adults aged 15 years
and older. In every country, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodol-
ogy was used, with interviews varying from 500 in smaller countries to 1,500 in larger
nations. This methodology ensures that on the issues of gender, age, region and local-
ity size, each country as well as each level of sample is representative in proportion to
its population size. For the univariate analysis, a sample weighting scheme is used to
obtain meaningful descriptive results, as recommended in the wider literature (Sharon
and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) and the Eurobarometer
methodology. For the multivariate analysis, however, debate exists over whether to
use a weighting scheme (Pfeffermann, 1993; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al.,
2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994). Reﬂecting the majoritarian view, the decision
has been taken not to do so.
The face-to-face interviews adopted a gradual approach towards the more sensitive
questions. First, participants were asked attitudinal questions regarding theustrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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they had purchased and supplied undeclared goods. Here, we focus ﬁrst upon the at-
titudinal questions to examine the level of tax morale and second, the questions on the
supply and demand of undeclared work.
3.2 Variables
To analyse the aforementioned hypotheses, the dependent variable is a constructed
index of self-reported attitudes towards the acceptability of undeclared work based
on a ten-point Likert scale. Rather than use a single question to assess tax morale, this
survey thus uses a range of questions by asking the following:
Now I would like to know how you would rate various actions or behaviours. For each of them, please
tell me to what extent you ﬁnd it acceptable or not. Please use the following scale: “1” means that you
ﬁnd it absolutely unacceptable and “10” means that you ﬁnd it absolutely acceptable: (1) someone re-
ceives welfare payments without entitlement; (2) an individual is hired by a household for work and
s/he does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security authorities even though it should
be declared; (3) A ﬁrm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the payment received to
the tax or social security authorities; (4) a ﬁrm is hired by another ﬁrm for work and it does not declare
its activities to the tax or social security authorities; (5) a ﬁrm hires an individual and all or a part of the
wages paid to him\her are not ofﬁcially declared and (6) someone evades taxes by not declaring or only
partially declaring their income.
Collating responses to these six questions, an aggregate ‘tax morale index’ is con-
structed for each individual. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefﬁcient of the scale is 0.875,
which shows a good internal consistency of the scale. The index is represented here
in the ten-point Likert scale original format. The lower the index value, the higher
is the tax morale.
To analyse H1 regarding the association between tax morale and undeclared work,
the following individual-level variables are analysed:Supplied
undeclared
worka dummy variable with recorded value 1 for persons who answered ‘yes’
to the question ‘Apart from a regular employment, have you yourself
carried out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12months?’ and
with recorded value 0 otherwise.Purchased
undeclared
goods/
servicesa dummy variable with recorded value 1 for persons who answered ‘yes’
to the question ‘Have you in the last 12months paid for any goods or
services of which you had a good reason to assume that they included
undeclared work (e.g. because there was no invoice or VAT receipt)?’
and with recorded value 0 otherwise.To analyse H2a-g regarding the socio-economic variations in tax morale, the
individual-level variables analysed are as follows:Gender© 2016 Thea dummy variable with value 1 for men and 0 for
women.Age a categorical variable for the age of the respondent
with value 1 for those aged 15 to 24 years old, value 2
for those aged 25 to 39, value 3 for those aged 40 to
54 and value 4 for those over 55 years old. In the
regression analysis, a numerical variable is used with
the exact age of the respondent.Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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respondent with value 1 for married/remarried
individuals, value 2 for cohabiters, value 3 for
singles, value 4 for those separated or divorced and
value 5 for widowed and for other form of marital
status.Age when stopped full time
educationa categorical variable for age of the respondent when
stopped full time education with value 1 for 15 years
old and under, value 2 for 16–19 years old and value 3
for 20 years old or over.People 15+ years in own
householda categorical variable for people 15+years in
respondent’s household (including the respondent)
with value 1 for one person, value 2 for two persons,
value 3 for three persons and value 4 for four persons
or more.Children (up to 14 years old
in the household)a categorical variable for number of children with
value 1 for individuals with no children, value 2 for
the presence of children less than 10 years old live in
respondent’s household, value 3 for the presence of
children aged 10 to 14 years old and value 4 for the
presence of children less than 10 years old and
children aged 10 to 14 years old live in respondent’s
household.Employment a categorical variable for the employment status of
the respondent with value 1 for self-employed, value 2
for employed and value 3 for not working.Difﬁculties paying bills a categorical variable for the respondent difﬁculties in
paying bills with value 1 for having difﬁculties most
of the time, value 2 for occasionally and value 3 for
almost never/ never.Area a categorical variable for the area where the
respondent lives with value 1 for rural area or village,
value 2 for small or middle sized town and value 3 for
large town.To test the explanations for cross-national variations in tax morale (H3-5), mean-
while, the same country-level variables employed in studies explaining cross-national
variations in undeclared work are here used (Eurofound, 2013; Vanderseypen et al.,
2013; Williams, 2013). To evaluate the modernisation hypotheses (H3a and H3b),
the indicators used are as follows:
GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (Eurostat, 2015a).European Quality of
Government Indexfocus on both perceptions and experiences with public
sector corruption, along with the extent to which citizens
believe various public sector services are impartially
allocated and of good quality. The index is standardised
with a mean of zero and higher scores implying higher
quality of government (Charron et al., 2014).urnal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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intervention hypothesis (H5a), the indicators used are as follows:Current taxes on income,
wealth, etc.© 2016covers all compulsory, unrequited payments, in cash or in
kind, levied periodically by general government and by
the rest of the world on the income and wealth of
institutional units, and some periodic taxes assessed
neither on income nor wealth (Eurostat, 2015b).Implicit tax rate on labour approximates to the average effective tax burden on
labour and is the sum of all direct and indirect taxes and
employees’ and employers’ social contributions levied on
employed labour income divided by the total
compensation of employees (Eurostat, 2015c).Meanwhile, to evaluate H4b and H5b, the following indicator is analysed:Social protection
expendituresocial beneﬁts, which consist of transfers, in cash or in kind,
to households and individuals to relieve them of the burden
of a deﬁned set of risks or needs administration costs, which
represent the costs charged to the scheme for its management
and administration other expenditure, which consists of
miscellaneous expenditure by social protection schemes
(payment of property income and other). It is calculated in
current prices as percentage of GDP (Eurostat, 2015d).Finally, and to evaluate the slippery slope hypothesis (H6) that there is an associa-
tion between tax morale and the perceived penalties and risk of detection, the follow-
ing variables are analysed:Expected
sanctiona categorical variable for the respondent expected sanction if
someone was discovered to be receiving income from work that was
not declared to the relevant authorities, with value 1 for normal tax
or social security contributions due, value 2 for normal tax or social
security contributions due, plus a ﬁne, and value 3 for prison.Detection risk a categorical variable for the respondent perception about the level
of risk of being detected (for undeclared work) with value 1 for very
high, value 2 for fairly high, value 3 for fairly small and value 4 for
very small.3.3 Analytical methods
To evaluate the association between tax morale and participation in undeclared work
(H1) and the level of tax morale across population groups (H2), a multilevel logistic
regression analysis is conducted across the individual-level variables, whilst the
hypotheses (H3-5) investigating the country-level variables associated with a higher
tax morale are tested by staged multilevel logistic regression analysis utilising the
hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within countries), which includes the
individual-level variables, and then explores whether each country-level independentThe Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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pery slope hypothesis that tax morale is associated with the perceived penalties and
risks of detection (H6), we investigate their views on these policy measures to analyse
whether they are signiﬁcantly associated with higher tax morale whilst holding con-
stant the other variables. Later, we report the results.4 FINDINGS
The mean tax morale score for the EU-28 regarding the acceptability of participating
in undeclared work is 2.19 (where 1 is totally unacceptable and 10 totally acceptable).
As Figure 1 reveals however, its acceptability varies according to whether it is a ﬁrm
or individual engaging in such work. There is less tolerance for ﬁrms engaging in un-
declared work than individuals. The mean tax morale score is 2.14 for a ﬁrm doing
undeclared work for a household and 2.07 for a ﬁrm hiring an undeclared worker,
and 1.88 for ﬁrms doing undeclared work for another ﬁrm (i.e. the lower the score,
the more unacceptable the activity). Meanwhile, there is greater tolerance when indi-
viduals rather than businesses engage in undeclared work; 2.20 for a person partially
or completely concealing their income and 3.13 for a person conducting undeclared
work for a household. The exception is those claiming beneﬁts without entitlement,
such as whilst working undeclared, which at 1.71 is the most unacceptable of all forms
of undeclared work.
There are, moreover, differences in tax morale across EU regions. Citizens in East-
Central Europe have the lowest tax morale and those living in Nordic nations have
the highest tax morale, although the variations in the acceptability of the different
types of undeclared work remain broadly similar across all regions.
To evaluate ﬁrst, whether the association between tax morale and participation in
undeclared work remains signiﬁcant when other characteristics are taken into account
and held constant (H1), second, whether the variations across population groups are
signiﬁcant (H2), third, the validity of the contrasting explanations for the cross-Figure 1: Acceptability of different types of undeclared work: EU-28 regions
© 2016 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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here report the results of a staged multilevel logistic regression model, which utilises
the hierarchical nature of the data (individuals within countries).
The ﬁrst stage in the analysis was to estimate a baseline random intercept model
with no explanatory variables, in order to identify whether a multilevel approach
was appropriate. The likelihood-ratio test that there is no cross-country variation in
individual tax morale can be safely rejected (X2 (1)=1873.58, p<0.001). Over 11
per cent of the variance in tax morale was accounted for at the country level, indicat-
ing signiﬁcant variation between countries in citizens’ tax morale. Having determined
that the multilevel mixed-effects linear regression should be the one used, the second
stage involved constructing a model with ﬁrst-level (i.e. individual-level) variables in
an attempt to understand their effect. The third stage then involved including both
ﬁrst-level and second-level (i.e. country-level) variables in order to understand the ef-
fects at both levels.
Table 1 reports the results. Models 1–3 are random intercept models that only in-
clude the individual-level variables. Examining whether there is a signiﬁcant associa-
tion between tax morale and participation in undeclared work, this is found to be the
case across all models. Those supplying undeclared work have lower tax morale, as
do those purchasing undeclared goods and services (conﬁrming H1).
Examining how tax morale varies across population groups, model 1 examines
solely the socio-demographic characteristics. This reveals that women have higher
levels of tax morale (conﬁrming H2a), as do older people (conﬁrming H2b), married
people compared with any other marital status category (conﬁrming H2c) and those
who have spent longer in formal education (conﬁrming H2d). However, there is no
relationship between household size and tax morale, although those with at least
one child less than 10 years old have higher tax morale than those with no children
(partially conﬁrming H2d)
Model 2 then adds the socio-economic characteristics of employment status and
household ﬁnancial circumstances. All the socio-demographic variations discussed
in model 1 remain signiﬁcant. The additional ﬁnding, however, is that the self-
employed do not have a signiﬁcantly lower tax morale than the employed and those
not working (refuting H2e), although those who most of the time face difﬁculties pay-
ing the household bills do have lower tax morale than those without such acute ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculties (conﬁrming H2f). Finally, model 3 adds spatial characteristics. Again,
all the previous ﬁndings remain the same. The additional ﬁnding, however, is that in-
dividuals living in more urban areas have higher tax morale than those living in rural
areas (refuting H2g).
Turning to the cross-national variations, Figure 2 reports the residual level-2 coun-
try effects derived from model 3. This demonstrates the differences between countries
whilst preserving the underlying multilevel structure of the data. A country whose
conﬁdence interval does not overlap the line at zero differs signiﬁcantly from the
EU-28 average at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level. At the lower end, Cyprus, Malta,
Finland, Greece, Croatia, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia, France and the UK
are countries for which the conﬁdence intervals do not overlap with 0, indicating that
they have signiﬁcantly higher tax morale than the EU average. At the upper end,
Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Estonia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Latvia are the countries with intervals that
do not overlap with 0, indicating a signiﬁcantly lower tax morale than the EU-28
average.© 2016 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Figure 2: Country-level effects (±1.96se) after adjusting for individual-level variables in model 3
15Tackling the undeclared economy in the European UnionTo test H3-5 regarding the explanations for these signiﬁcant cross-national
variations in tax morale, and given that these country-level variables are strongly
correlated, sequential models are applied to provide alternative perspectives on the
cross-national variations in tax morale. Starting with the modernisation thesis, no sig-
niﬁcant association is found between tax morale and GDP per capita in purchasing
power standards (refuting H3a) or the European Quality of Government Index (refut-
ing H3b). Evaluating the over-interference and under-intervention hypotheses, more-
over, no signiﬁcant association is found between tax morale and the implicit tax rate
on labour, although a signiﬁcant relationship is found between tax morale and cur-
rent taxes on income, wealth, etc (model 4). The direction of the association is in
the opposite direction to that proposed by the over-interference hypothesis (refuting
H4a but conﬁrming H5a). Furthermore, evaluating the association between social
protection expenditure and tax morale, a positive signiﬁcant association is found (re-
futing H4b and conﬁrming H5b). As such, this analysis conﬁrms the ‘state under-
intervention’ (political economy) explanation (models 4 and 5) and refutes both the
modernization and state over-interference (neo-liberal) explanations. Finally, and ex-
amining the slippery slope hypothesis, those who perceive the penalties and risk of be-
ing detected as small or fairly high have lower tax morale (conﬁrming H6).5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Reporting the results of 27,563 interviews conducted in 2013 across the EU-28, mul-
tilevel logistic regression analysis has revealed not only a strong association between
participation in undeclared work and the level of tax morale but also how variations
in the level of tax morale are explained both by country-level structural conditions as
well as individual-level characteristics such as gender, age, education and employ-
ment status.
In terms of theoretical advances therefore, this article makes three major contribu-
tions. First, by revealing the strong association between tax morale and participation
in undeclared work in the EU-28, it conﬁrms that institutional theory may be a useful
lens through which to explore the issue of tackling undeclared work. Viewing tax
morale as a measure of the gap between state morale and civic morale, participation© 2016 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
16 Colin Williams and Ioana Horodnicin undeclared work can be seen as arising when there is asymmetry between the cod-
iﬁed laws and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, values and beliefs of
citizens that constitute the informal institutions. Second, and importantly for advanc-
ing understanding of undeclared work from an institutional theory viewpoint, the
ﬁnding of this multilevel analysis (individuals within countries) is that variations in
the level of tax morale (and thus the propensity to engage in undeclared work) cannot
be explained in terms of the level of economic development and quality of governance
(modernization theory) or in terms of high taxes and too much government interven-
tion in social protection (the state over-interference or neo-liberal theory). However,
lower tax morale (and thus higher levels of undeclared work) can be explained from
a political economy perspective as arising when there is state under-intervention in
the form of lower tax rates and lower levels of social protection expenditure. Third,
this article also reveals that the impacts of state under-intervention on tax morale
(and thus the propensity to engage in undeclared work) are not evenly distributed
across the populations. Men, younger people, those with fewer years in full-time
education and those with difﬁculties in paying the household bills are more likely to
reject ‘state morale’ and have lower tax morale (and thus greater propensity to engage
in undeclared work). Whether this is similarly the case in other global regions when
explaining the contrasting levels of tax morale now needs to be investigated.
In terms of policy implications meanwhile, this article reveals that a social actor ap-
proach that pursues initiatives to improve tax morale could usefully complement the
conventional rational economic actor approach of increasing penalties and the risks
of detection (as well as beneﬁts of declared work). Institutional theory has conven-
tionally advocated improving the quality of governance in order to reduce institu-
tional asymmetry, such as by reducing public sector corruption (Thai and Turkina,
2014). For example, initiatives advocated include improving procedural justice, which
refers to whether employers and employees believe that the tax authority treat then in
a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Murphy, 2005), procedural fairness,
which is the extent to which employers and employees believe they are paying their
fair share compared with others (Molero and Pujol, 2012; Wenzel, 2006), and redis-
tributive justice, which refers to whether employers and employees believe they re-
ceive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes that they pay
(Kirchgässner, 2010). Here, however, by identifying that variations in tax morale
are less determined by modernization theory and more by state under-intervention,
this article reveals that it is necessary to pursue higher tax levels and higher levels
of social protection as a means of raising tax morale and reducing the propensity to
engage in undeclared work. Moreover, the ﬁnding that individual-level characteristics
are important, such as gender, age, education and household ﬁnancial circumstances,
intimates that tackling undeclared work additionally requires a range of initiatives so
far seldom considered. These include the following: improving educational attain-
ment; the introduction of schemes to make greater use of older citizens as local role
models and mentors for younger people; and greater emphasis on improving women’s
participation in the labour force. It also suggests the populations that need to be
targeted when seeking to change norms, values and beliefs regarding compliance,
such as when educating groups about the value of taxation by providing information
on the public goods and services paid for by their taxes and advertising campaigns
about the beneﬁts of declared work (Saeed and Shah, 2011).
Consequently, if this article stimulates a theoretical and empirical shift in future
studies towards evaluating and explaining undeclared work in terms of the level of© 2016 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
17Tackling the undeclared economy in the European Uniontax morale, and this is viewed through the lens of institutional theory, then it will have
achieved one of its major objectives. If this then leads to recognition that combining
the rational economic actor and social actor policy approaches and measures may be
the most effective way forward, then it will have achieved its wider intention.
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